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Corrections Law:
The Supreme Court and Treatment in
Correctional and Forensic Mental
-Health Facilities: Recent Trends and
Decisions
By Michael L. Perlin*
On a Perry Mason rerun on TV the
other night, there was a scene in a
darkroom. Paul Drake (Perry's original investigator) had taken a picture
of a crime scene, and was developing
the negative. Forms and shapes began
to emerge slowly as the blank piece
of developing paper ''came alive,''
and, eventually, the viewer was able
to see the completed picture (which,
needless to say, gave Perry a clue that
no one else saw). The image serves
as a defining metaphor for this topic:
recent trends in mental health law
from a legal perspective: The United
States Supreme Court continues, bit
by bit, partial image by partial image,
to fill in pieces of a multidimensional
puzzle.
This puzzle has many subcomponents: the extent of the civil and constitutional rights that are owed mentally disabled individuals facing the
involuntary civil commitment process; the rights owed to such persons
during institutionalization; the rights
owed upon release from psychiatric
facilities; the rights owed such per~~ns when they are awaiting trial in
Jail. ?~ follow.mg sentence to penal
facil1t1es; the impact that mental dis-

ability has on the criminal trial process (as to such questions as the admissibility of confessions made by
severely mentally disabled individuals, the application of the privilege
against self-incrimination to pretrial
psychiatric interviews, the right to
access to expert witnesses to assist in
trial preparation); the limits of legal
regulation of mental health providers; the ways that courts assess privilege and/or subordinate mental health
professional expertise during the trial
process; the constitutional limitations
on incompetency to stand trial and
insanity defense proceedings; and the
role of mental disability in capital
punishment decision making.
Each year, additional pieces of this
puzzle are filled in. 1 Sometimes, the
impact of the real world on clinicians
and forensic mental health professionals is fairly clear; sometimes, it
is murkier. 2 Over the years, certain
1

See generally Michael L. Perlin,
· Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal (1989 and 1994 pocket part).
2
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, ''Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law,''
16 Int'l J .L. & Psychiatry 47 (1993)
(hereinafter
Perlin,
"Decoding");
Michael L. Perlin, "Reading the Supreme Court's Tea Leaves: Predicting
Judicial Behavior in Civil and Criminal
Right to Refuse Treatment Cases,'' 12
Am. J. Forens. Psychiatry 37 (1991)
(hereinafter Perlin, "Tea Leaves");

* Professor, New York Law School
New York, N. Y. An earlier version of
this paper was presented at the annual
California Forensic Mental Health Association conference, March 1993.
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shown no inclination to return to it.
While it has found that juveniles are
entitled to fewer procedural due process rights at involuntary civil commitment hearings than are adults, 7 it
has never considered the important
question of the scope of rights due
to individuals facing, for example,
outpatient commitment. 8 Whether the
court will ever choose to address
these questions is simply anybody's
guess.
Yet, in the past four years, the
Supreme Court has chosen to decide
five important mental disability law
cases that have a potentially significant impact on both clinicians and
forensic witnesses. Each of these cases is briefly discussed and its potential
impact on the constitutional rights
owed to individuals institutionalized
in correctional and forensic mental
health facilities is appraised as well
as the potential liability of providers
if these rights are violated. 9

baseline principles become ''burned
in'' in a way that clarifies some of
the Court's core values; for example,
the Court, it is now clear, believes
that the standard of proof in an involuntary civil commitment case is higher than in a ''typical'' civil case but
lower than in a criminal case. 3 Other
gaps remain, leading us to ponder
how the Court would decide a case
with a certain fact pattern if only it
were to be presented: for example,
an issue that the Court will deal with
this term, the constitutionality of employing a different burden of proof in
cases involving the involuntary civil
commitment of mentally ill persons
from that used in cases involving
mentally retarded persons. 4
In other areas, one can only speculate. Although the Court has dealt on
the merits with questions involving
the right of prisoners and of criminal
defendants awaiting trial to refuse
treatment, 5 it has sidestepped the
same question when it arose in a case
involving civil ·patients, 6 and has

7
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979).
8 See, e.g., 1 Perlin, note 1 supra,
§ 3.78.
9 See, e.g.,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent
(D. Wexler ed., 1990); Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence (D. Wexler & B.
Winick eds., 1991); Michael L. Perlin,
"On 'Sanism' " 46 SMU L. Rev. 373
(1992) (hereinafter Perlin, "Sanism");
Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, "Sanism, Social Science, and the
Development of Mental Disability Law
Jurisprudence," 11 Behav. Sci. & L. 47
(1993); Michael L. Perlin, "Morality
and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law:
Of 'Ordinary Common Sense,' Heuristic
Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance,''
19 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 131
(1991) (hereinafter Perlin, "Morality");
Michael L. Perlin, "Pretexts and Mental
Disability Law: The Case of Competency," 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 625 (1993)
(hereinafter
Perlin,
"Pretexts");
Michael L. Perlin, "Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and
Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability

Michael L. Perlin, ''The Supreme Court,
the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or 'Doctrinal
Abyss' "? 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1987)
(hereinafter Perlin, "Supreme Court");
Michael L. Perlin, "The United States
Supreme Court and Mental Health Law:
A Retrospective,'' 4 Med. & L. 49
(1985).
3 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418 (1979).
4
After the presentation of this paper,
the Supreme Court decided, in Heller v.
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993), that such a
differing burden of proof did not violate
the equal protection clause. See 1 Perlin,
note 1 supra,§ 3.39A(l994pocketpart);
Michael L. Perlin, 1he Law and Mental
Disability§ 1.24 (1994).
5 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210 (1990) (prisoners); Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (defendants
awaiting criminal trial).

6 See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982).
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Washington v. Harper
In Washington v. Harper, 11 the
court answered the question of
whether a convicted prisoner could be
forcibly medicated against his will.
Here, the court found that the due
process clause applied to institutional
medication decision making, on the
theory that prisoners possessed a
"significant liberty interest" in
avoiding the unwanted administration of such drugs. 12 On the other
hand, the need to consider prison
safety and security led it to uphold a
state regulation limiting the prisoner's right, as the regulation was "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. " 13 While the question
of drug side effects was a factor to
consider, the Court chose to focus
instead on the ''needs of the institution,'' including the ''safety of prison
staff's and administrative personnel''
and the' 'duty to take reasonable measures for the prisoners' own
safety.'' 14
While providing the prisoner with
a limited remedy, the majority in
Harper selectively chose to stress
those aspects of the data available on
the effects of antipsychotic drugs that
discussed the benefits of such medication, while at the same time acknowledging but discounting the
harmful and debilitating effects of
these drugs. 15 Harper thus accommo-

One preliminary observation-the
notion of ''criminalization of the
mentally ill''-may not be helpful
in resolving these issues. The best
empirical research rebuts the notions
that deinstitutionalization has had
much of a significant impact on
''criminalization'' and that deinstitutionalization has led to the overuse
of the incompetency-to-stand-trial
process as a means of dealing with
nuisance offenders, and suggests
that, while mentally ill persons are
frequently treated more poorly in
many aspects of the correctional system than are nonmentally ill persons,
the link to deinstitutionalization policies is simply not there. 10

The Supreme Court Cases

In 1990, the Supreme Court turned
to mental disability law questions on
two separate occasions. In one decision, it considered for the first time
on the merits of the question of the
right of an institutionalized population to refuse the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication;
in the other, it turned for the first time
to the question of the constitutional
limitations that could be placed on the
voluntary commitment process.
Law,'' 20 N. Eng. J. Crim. & Civ.
Confinement 369 (1944) (hereinafter
Perlin, ''Pretextual Bases'').
10
See Michael L. Perlin, "Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization,''
28 Hous. L. Rev. 63, 115 n.303 (1991),
discussing, inter alia, Thomas Arvanites,
''The Impact of State Mental Hospital
Deinstitutionalization on Commitments
for Incompetency to Stand Trial,'' 26
Criminol. 307 (1988), and Thomas Arvanites, ''The Differential Impact of
Deinstitutionalization on White and
Nonwhite Defendants Found Incompetent to Stand Trial,'' 17 Bull. Am. Acad.
Psychiatry & L. 311 (1989).

11
494 U.S. 210(1990); see generally,
2 Perlin, note 1 supra, § 5.64A (1994
pocket part); Perlin, note 4 supra,
§ 2.22.
12
Harper, 494 U.S. at222.
13

/d.

Id. at 223-224.
See Harper, 494 U.S. at 240 n.5
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part):
1
•

15

The Court relies heavily on the Brief
filed by the American Psychiatric
Association et al. and the Washington State Psychiatric Association ...
to discount the severity of these
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dated social science evidence with
an important strand of the Supreme
Court's penological jurisprudence:
''Prison security concerns will, virtually without exception, trump individual autonomy inte_rests. '' 16
Zinermon v. Burch
In the other 1990 case, Zinermon
v. Burch, 17 the Court looked at an
entirely different issue: the interplay
between Section 1983 civil rights
remedies and the voluntary hospital
admissions process. Put simply, Zinermon held that a voluntary patient
could proceed with a civil rights damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against state hospital officials where
he charged that those officials should
have known that he was incompetent
to voluntarily commit himself to the
hospital at the time he signed voluntary admission forms. 18
drugs. However, medical findings
discussed in other briefs support conclusions of the Washington Supreme
Court and challenge the reliability of
the Psychiatrists' Brief.
Compare e.g., id. at 230 (majority relies
on Psychiatrists' Brief for proposition
that tardive dyskinesia is found in 10 to
25 percent of hospitalized patients), to
id. at 239 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part) (chances greater than one in four of patient developing
tardive dysk:inesia, and rate is
increasing).
In Harper, both the state and the defense submitted studies discussing drug
side effects. While both sets of studies
acknowledged the side effects' seriousness, they disagreed on how pervasive
they were in institutional populations.
See id. at 229.
16
See Perlin & Dorfman, note 9
supra, at 57.
11
494 U.S. 113 (1990).
18
494 U.S. 113, 130-139 (1990); see
1 Perlin, note 1 supra, § 3.69 (1994
pocket part) & 3 id.,§ 12.33 (1994 pocket part); Perlin, note 4 supra, §§ 1.33,
3.14; Michael L. Perlin, ''Understanding
Zinermon v. Burch,'' in 3 Psychiatric

In Zinermon, community mental
health services workers had given a
''hallucinating, confused, psychotic'' patient forms to sign consenting
to admission and treatment. He
signed the papers, stating that he was
signing himself "into heaven. " 19 He
was subsequently detained for five
months in the state hospital without a
hearing as to the propriety of his
hospitalization and treatment. 20
After his civil rights action was
dismissed, he appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. In a sharply
split opinion, it found that predeprivation procedural safeguards might
have helped prevent the alleged violation of the plaintiffs liberty interest, 21
it being foreseeable both that persons
such as the plaintiff might be incapable of exercising informed consent to
admission, 22 and that such deprivations would occur at a ''predictable
point'' in the admission process. 23
Here, the burden rested on the hospital staff to ensure that the voluntary
admission process not be violated,
and that proper procedures be afforded both to patients who were unwilling to consent, and to those unable to
execute such a consent. 24
This complex procedural decision
raises for the first time the concerns
of a majority of the court as to the
risks that some ''voluntary'' patients
may not be competent to admit themselves to psychiatric facilities. 25
Thus, writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun-generally the justice
the most sensitive to mental health
Malpractice Risk Management, chapter
6 (1993).
19
Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 118, 119.
20
Id. at 118-120.
21
Id. at 127-130.
22
Id. at 138-139.
23
Id. at 134-137.
24
Id. at 130-139.
"Id. at 132-135.

•
26
issues
-noted that ''the very nature
of mental illness'' makes it ''foreseeable" that such a person "will be
unable to understand any proferred
'explanation and disclosure of the
subject matter' of the forms that a
person is asked to sign, and will be
unable 'to make a knowing and willful decision' whether to consent to
admission. '' 27
Mental illness, he added, created
''special problems'' regarding informed consent, suggesting that the
state might not be justified in ''taking
at face value'' a mentally ill person's
request for admission and treatment
at a mental hospital. 28 As a person
incapable of making an informed decision is similarly likely to be unable
to benefit from a voluntary patient's
right to request discharge, 29 such a
person would be in danger of being
confined indefinitely without benefit
of the procedural safeguards inherent
in the involuntary placement process,

a process that was ''specifically designed to protect persons incapable of
looking out for their own interests.' ' 30
Riggins v. Nevada
The Court's decision to grant certiorari in Riggins v. Nevada presented this question: Did the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
drugs to a criminal defendant during
the pendency of his trial violate his
ri~h.t to a fair trial by impeding his
ability to consult with counsel, by
interfering with the content of his own
testimony, or by negatively affecting
his capacity to follow the proceedings?31
While in jail on murder charges,
Riggins told a jail psychiatrist that he
was ''hearing voices in his head and
having trouble sleeping,'' and informed him that, in the past, he had
been prescribed the antipsychotic
drug Mellaril. 32 The psychiatrist then
prescribed Mellaril, and subsequently increased the dosage to 800
mgs. per day, an unusually large
amount. 33 The defendant subsequently sought a court order that
would have terminated the administration of antipsychotic drugs during
the pendency of the trial, on the theo-

26
See Gary Melton, ''Realism in Psychology and Humanism in Law: Psycholegal Studies at Nebraska," 69 Neb.
L. Rev. 251, 272-273 (1990).

27
Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 133 (emphasis added) (quoting Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 394.455(22) (1981). Compare Loukas
v. Hofbauer, 784 F. Supp. 377, 382
(E.D. Mich. 1991) ("A state official's
failure to commence in a timely fashion
a hearing when a prisoner is classified
for administrative segregation is not as
~redictable as the incompetence of a pa?ent from whom an official is seeking
mformed consent for admission to a state
mental hospital''; while Zinermon analysis is.' 'ambiguous," predeprivation proces.s is required in prison inmate classification case).

Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 133.
112 S. Ct. 1810, 1814 (1992). See
generally, 2 Perlin, note 1 supra,
§ 5.65A (1994 pocket part); Perlin, note
4supra, § 2.18.
30
31

32

Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
See id. at 1816 (800 mgs. within the
"toxic range"); see also, id. at 1819
(Kennedy, J. , concurring) (expert testified that 800 mgs. was a sufficient dosage
to "tranquilize an elephant"). Other experts testified that the drug could make
the defendant ''uptight,'' or could cause
"drowsiness or confusion"; as amicus,
the American Psychiatric Association
stated that, in extreme cases, the sedative
properties of the drug might even ''affect
thought processes." Id. at 1816.
33

28

Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 133 n.18.
Id. at 133 (citing Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 394.465(2)(a)(1981). Compare Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343
(l:~.D.C:. 1987) ~no~ a single patient comrrutted m the District of Columbia over
twenty-~w~-~ear ~riod exercised rights
to seek Judicial review of commitment).
29
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with that person's liberty,' ' 41 and focused on Harper's discussion of such
drugs' side effects. 42 As Harper
found forced drugging of a convicted
prisoner impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification, '' 43 a
pretrial detainee (such as Riggins)
would be entitled to ''at least as much
protection.' ' 44
Although the Court did not set
down a bright-line test articulating
the state's burden in sustaining forced
drugging of a detainee at trial, it
found that this burden would be met
had the state demonstrated medical
appropriateness and consideration of
less intrusive alternatives, either (1)
''essential for the sake of Riggins'
own safety or the safety of others,''
or (2) a lack of less intrusive means
by which to obtain an adjudication of
the defendant's guilt or innocence. 45
It noted further that it was not deciding whether a competent criminal defendant could refuse drugs if the cessation of such medications would
make him incompetent to stand trial. 46
The error below may well have
impaired the defendant's trial rights,
the majority found. The drugs' side

ry that, as he was proferring an insanity defense, he had a right to have
the jury see him in ''his true mental
state.' ' 34 After hearing conflicting expert testimony, 35 the trial judge denied defendant's motion. 36
Defendant presented an insanity
defense at trial, and testified that
''voices in his head'' had told him that
killing the victim would be justifiable
homicide. 37 He was found guilty and
sentenced to death. 38 On appeal, the
Supreme Court, in 1992, reversed.
While it presumed that the administration of the drugs was ''medically
appropriate,' ' 39 it weighed whether
that administration, nevertheless, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. 40
In answering this question, it turned
first to the conclusion in Harper that
''the forcible injection of medication
into a nonconsenting person's body
represents a substantial interference
34
Id. On the ways that jurors make
stereotypic assumptions about mentally
disabled individuals based on visual imagery, see e.g. , Michael L. Perlin, "Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense:
'Ordinary Common Sense' and Heuristic
Reasoning," 69 Neb. L. Rev. 3 (1990);
Michael L. Perlin, ''Unpacking the
Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of
Insanity Defense Jurisprudence,'' 40
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 599 (1989- 1990)
(hereinafter Perlin, "Myths"); Perlin,
"Sanism," note 9 supra; see generally,
Michael L. Perlin, The Jurisprudence of
the Insanity Defense ( 1994) (hereinafter
Perlin, Jurisprudence).
3 ~ See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813.
36 Id. By this time, Riggins was receiving 800 mgs. again. Id.
31 Id.
38 Id.

41
Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814 (quoting
Harper, 494 U.S. at229).
42
See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 18141815 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 229230).

43

Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 545 (1979); O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
44

4

~

46

Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.

Id. Questions involving the competency determination process are discussed in United States v. Charters, 863
F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1016 (1990); see generally,
Michael L. Perlin, ''Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions?
Stripping the Facade from United States
v. Charters,'' 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 957
(1990).

Id. at 1814.
Because the issue was not preserved
below, the Court declined to rule on the
question of whether the drugging violated
Riggins' s Eighth Amendment right to
show the jurors his true mental condition
at his sentencing hearing. Id.
39

40
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effects might have affected not just
the defendant's outward appearance,
but also ''the content of his testimony . . . , his ability to follow the
proceedings, or the substance of his
communication with counsel. '' 47 Finally, it concluded that allowing the
defendant to present expert testimony
to explain the side effects could not
possibly be curative of the possibility
that defendant's own testimony, his
interaction with counsel, or his trial
comprehension were compromised
by the drugs, and even with this testimonial assistance, an ''unacceptable
risk of prejudice remained.' ' 48
Justice Kennedy (the author of
Harper) concurred, taking a stronger
antidrugging position than did the
majority. Focusing carefully and extensively on the potential for side
effects, he wrote that he would not
allow the use of antipsychotic medication to make a defendant competent
to stand trial "absent an extraordinary showing'' on the state's part,
and noted further that he doubted this
showing could be made ''given our
present understanding of the properties of these drugs. ' ' 49 In discussing
the side effects, Justice Kennedy concentrated on their potential impact
on defendant's fair trial rights, their
alteration of his demeanor in a way
that ''will prejudice his reactions and
presentation in the courtroom,'' and
their rendering him ''unable or unwilling'' to assist counsel. so If the
medication inhibits the defendant's
capacity to react to the proceedings
and to demonstrate ''remorse or compassion,'' the prejudice suffered by
defendant can be especially acute at
the sentencing stage. st
47

Riggins, 112 S. Ct. 1816.

•a Id.
49
Id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J. , concurring).
'°Id. at 1818-1819.
si Id. at 1819-1820 (citing William
Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, "Why

Coming so soon after the decision
in Harper, Riggins is somewhat surprising. s2 It differs importantly from
Harper in that the court treated Harper as a prison security case, while it
read Riggins as a fair trial case; yet,
this difference in the litigants' legal
status self-evidently has no effect on
the physiological or neurological potential impact of the drugs in question. s3 Nevertheless, the side-effects
language in Harper (subordinated
there because of security reasons) is
emphasized in Riggins (where such
issues are absent) by nature of the
Court's consideration of the question
in the context of a fair trial question.
Riggins' use of ''less intrusive alternatives'' language is especially
surprising. Since the Supreme Court
chose to bypass this construction in
Youngberg v. Romeos4 and to use in
its place the phrase ''reasonably nonrestrictive confmement conditions' 'ss
as part of its articulation of a ''substantial professional judgment''
test, s6 it has appeared that there was
simply no place for this doctrine in
mental disability law. s7 Riggins has
given it new life in the context of a
criminal case, and it will thus be
necessary for litigators and judges to
Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative
Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty
Cases," 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 5153 (1987-1988)) (assessment ofremorse
may be dispositive factor to jurors in
death penalty cases).
s2 See Perlin & Dorfman, note 9
supra, at 57-58.
s3 Compare Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at
1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring), stressing "litigational" side effects.
54

457 U.S. 307 (1982).
at 324; see generally 2 Perlin,
note 1 supra, § 4.36.
ss Id.

56 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-323;
see generally 2 Perlin, note 1 supra,

§ 4.35.
s7 See 2

Perlin, note 1 supra,§ 4.39.

rethink the potential reapplication of
the "less intrusive means" or "least
restrictive alternative'' test in subsequent federal constitutional litigation.58

It rejected on three different bases
the state's argument that Foucha's
antipersonality diagnosis provided a
.permissible rationale for further insti. tutionalization. First, Foucha could
not be civilly committed as currently
mentally ill and dangerous, since antisocial personality disorder is not
viewed as a "mental illness. " 63 Second, the Court found that if he could
no longer be held as an insanity acquittee, he was entitled to constitutionally adequate procedures to establish permissible grounds for his
confinement. 64 Finally, stressing the
''fundamental nature'' of the individual's "right to .liberty, " 65 the Court
concluded that Foucha-who had
never been convicted of a crimecould not be punished. 66 The state had
not shown, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the defendant was
mentally ill and dangerous, and
Foucha could thus no longer be kept
institutionalized; the testimony adduced below was an insufficient basis
for such a finding. 67
Justice O'Connor concurred, and
Justice Kennedy dissented in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice, arguing that, notwithstanding the jury's
verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity in Foucha' s underlying crim·inal trial, the case did not differ substantially from one in which a defen.dant had been convicted of the
precedent crime, and that earlier civil
cases relied on by the majority (such
as O'Connor and Addington v. Tex-

Foucha v. Louisiana
Foucha v. Louisiana., the second
1992 case, presented an appeal from
a state case that had upheld the continued postinsanity acquittal of a defendant who had been found to be no
longer mentally ill but who might
potentially still be dangerous. 59 At the
hearing below, no expert had testified
''positively'' that Foucha would be a
danger if he were to be released; one
witness stated, ''I don't think I would
feel comfortable in certifying that he
was not a danJer to himself or to
other people.''
In a sharply split opinion, the Supreme Court, per Justice White, reversed. Since the basis for holding
Foucha in a hospital as an insanity
acquittee had disappeared, the Court
found the state could no longer hold
him on that basis, 61 relying on its
opinion in 0 'Connor v. Doooldson62
for the proposition that, once the basis
for a constitutionally permissible
commitment disappeared, an individual could no longer be institutionalized.
" See M. Perlin, "Law as a Therapeutic and Anti-Therapeutic Agent'' (paper
presented at the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health's Division of Forensic Mental Health's annual conference, Auburn, Mass. (May 1992), at 9
(discussing these implications of Riggins)).

63

State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138
(La. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1780
(1992); see generally 3 Perlin, note 1
supra, § 15.25A (1994 pocket part); Perlin, note 4 supra, §§ 4, 38.
60
Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786.
61
Id. at 1784.
62
422 U.S. 563, 574-575 (1975); see
1 Perlin, note 1 supra, § 2.12.
59

Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784-1785.

64

Id. at 1785.
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 316 (1982); Untied States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
66
Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785 (citing
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,
369 (1983)).
65

67

465

Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786.

as) 68 should thus be inapplicable, 69

based on a local statute that the defendant bore the burden of proof to show
incompetency. 74 He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. 75 On
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.76
It rejected defendant's argument
that fundamental fairness required
that the burden of proof be allocated
to the state. 77 On the other hand, it
conceded that an impaired defendant
might be limited in his ability to assist
counsel in demonstrating incompetence, although that inability, by itself, might constitute probative evidence of incompetence, noting
further that defense counsel will often
have ''the best informed view'' of the
defendant's ability to participate in
his defense. 78
Justice O'Connor concurred (on
behalf of herself and Justice Souter),
expressing concern that defendants
will feign incompetence, and that the
placement of the burden on the defendant may have a prophylactic effect
by ensuring that the greatest amount
of available information as to the defendant's mental condition is before
the court. 79
Justice Blackmun dissented (on behalf of himself and Justice Stevens).
He stressed language in Drope v.
Missouri that the right to be tried
while competent is ''fundamental'' to
the adversary system of justice, 80 and
added that the right to be tried while
competent was the "foundational
right' ' for the effective exercise of all
other criminal trial process rights. 81

characterizing the distinction between a ''not guilty by reason of
insanity" (NORI) and a "guilty but
mentally ill'' (GBMI) verdict as a
trivial "choice of nomenclature. " 70
Justice Thomas also dissented in
an opinion joined by the Chief Justice
and Justice Scalia. He focused at
some length on the possibility of
''calculated abuse of the .insanity defense'' by defendants who might
feign the plea, and speculated as to
how the public might react to the
specter of a ''serial killer ... returned
to the streets immediately after
trial. ,,71
Medina v. California
The final 1992 Supreme Court
case, Medina. v. California, 72 dealt
with what might appear at first blush
simply a narrow legal question:
whether placement of the burden of
proof on the defendant at an incompetency to stand trial proceeding violates due process. However, this case
also has potentially important implications for forensic witnesses and clinicians.
Medina was jailed after being arrested on multiple murder counts.
His counsel moved for a competency
hearing on the grounds that he was
unsure whether the defendant had the
abili~ to participate in the proceedings. Medina was found competent
61

441 U.S. 418 (1979)(clear and convincing evidence required burden of
proof in civil commitment hearing).
69
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Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1793-1794
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(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
10
Id. at 1793.
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11
Id. at 1801-1802; see also id. at
1797 (Kennedy, J. , dissenting).

78

77

Id. at 2575.
Id.
Id. at 2576.
Id. at 2577-2578.
Id. at 2580.

Id. at 2582-2583 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
79
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112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992); see generally 3 Perlin, note 1 supra,§ 14.05A (1994
pocket part); Perlin, note 4 supra,
§ 4.06.
13
•1d. at 2574.

80

420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2583 (Black- ·
mun, J., dissenting).
81
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The fact that, in cases where the
evidence is inconclusive, a defendant
may be subjected to trial introduces a
''systematic and unacceptably high
risk'' that persons will be tried and
convicted ''who are unable to follow
or participate in the proceedings determining their fate. '' 82 In addition,
Justice Blackmun concluded that the
court's confidence in defense counsel's role was misplaced. First, the
state generally has much better direct
access to pretrial defendants, especially those like Medina who awaited
trial under locked psychiatric security
observation. Second, psychiatric testimony is generally dispositive . at
competency hearings; in over 90 perent of cases, courts agree with expert
conclusions. Experts' opinions are
thus generally privileged over those
of trial counsel. 83

Third, there can no longer be any
question that procedural due process
protections apply to institutional
drugging questions. Even though the
plaintiff in Harper was unsuccessful,
the principles embedded in the case
were employed by the court to find
in Riggins' favor. Also, it is axiomatic that civil patients cannot have fewer
constitutional rights than convicted
prisoners, so it seems that Harper is
the final word on the debate over
whether or not a constitutional right
to refuse applies to civil hospitals . It
clearly does.
Fourth, there is now no longer any
question that the Section 1983 civil
rights relief is available as a litigation
tool to individuals seeking to challenge the legitimacy of their confinement, no matter what their commitment category. Zinermon clarifies
this, and it is inconceivable to me that
a lower court might reject this finding
in a case involving a person facing
involuntary civil commitment.
It is possible that Medina may result in an increased number of seriously mentally ill persons in jails and
prisons. If the decision's result is
that fewer "borderline" defendants
(borderline in the lay sense, not in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
sense) are found incompetent to stand
trial, then it is likely that they will
be tried, convicted, and imprisoned.
This may, in time, make institutional
management of correctional facilities
more difficult.
Perhaps the most revealing aspect
of Medina is Justice O'Connor's concurrence. O'Connor, who wrote the
majority in Riggins, focuses on her
major concern and rationale: that defendants may seek to feign incompetency to stand trial, and that placement of the burden of proof on the
defendant may lessen the likelihood
of such a defendant's success. This
"fear of feigning" is reflected both
in Justice Kennedy's arid Justice
Thomas' s dissents in Foucha as well,

The Impact of the Cases
As a result of these cases, one can
be fairly sure about the following
propositions. First, persons who are
not mentally ill can no longer be
constitutionally detained in forensic
mental health facilities. This holding
of Foucha seems to be crystal clear
and nonnegotiable (unless, of course,
there is a change in personnel on the
Court, and the new Court chooses to
consider the issue once again).
Second, any decision to medicate
a defendant awaiting trial must be
thought out very carefully, and the
entire question of drugging-to-make
competent needs to be carefully reexamined. While the Riggins case did
not address this latter question (since
it was not preserved correctly on appeal), the majority's language (and
the even more emphatic concurring
opinion by Justice Kennedy) clarifies
the Court's concern about this entire
area.
82

Id. at 2587-2588.

83

Id.
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and remains one of the dominating
principles of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence int his area, 84 in spite
of uncontradicted evidence that such
malingering is statistically rare and
virtually never successful in practice. 85
Foucha may result in states'
amending statutes to define ''mental
illness'' so as to include antisocial
personality disorder, which was Terry Foucha's diagnosis. The dilemma
h~re is an interesting one: Many
states, such as Louisiana, amended
their insanity defense statutes to make
sure that Anti-Social Personality Disorder (ASPD) defendants could not
avail themselves of an insanity plea.
Was the state "hoist by its own petard" in Foucha? Will legislatures
now feel that the risk of an occasional
extra insanity acquitee is less
troubling than the risk that a dangerous individual might be released from
all custodial restraints?
Will Foucha lead to the creation of
an intermediate type of facility for
''dangerous-but-no-longer-mentallyill" individuals? Would the creation
of such a facility be constitutionally
permissible? Is Foucha-who had
been involved in several altercations
with other patients while institutionalized86-exculpated, by reason of the
NORI verdict, from taking responsibility for what would otherwise be
considered criminal acts committed
at a forensic facility? Does it make
sense to prosecute such cases?

What will be the fallout of Justice
Thomas' s focus on the worst fears
about insanity acquittees....,-that they
"faked" the insanity defense in the
first place and that the improper use
of the defense will allow for the
speedy release of serial killers? His
opinion profoundly demonstrates the
degree to which judges can distort
social science evidence. Again, the
empirical data is clear that the inSanity defense is rarely feigned, that such
attempts are invariably ''seen
through'' by fact finders, and that
"successful" acquittees are generally institutionalized in maximum security facilities for far longer periods
than they would have been incarcerated in penal facilities had they been
convicted of the predicate crimes. 87
His reference to ''serial killers'' is
even more perplexing here, given the
fact that Foucha' s underlying charges
were burglary and firearms offenses.88
Harper and Riggins together may
lead to more right to refuse litigation
being brought by "other populations'': Defendants awaiting incompetency to stand trial determinations;
defendants found pennanently incompetent to stand trial under Jackson v. lndiana, 89 defendants found
NGRI. 90 Riggins may also lead to a
closer look at all questions involving
the involuntary administration of
medication in jails, and may even
begin to stem the ten-year exodus of
right-to-refuse-treatment cases from
federal court to state courts. 91

14
See generally Perlin, "Myths,"
note 34 supra; Perlin, Jurisprudence,
note 34 supra.

17
See Perlin, "Myths," note 34
supra, at 646-655, and Perlin Jurisprudence, note 34 supra, at 111-112 (citing

empirical studies and sources).
18
Id. at 1782.

85
See e.g., David Schretlen & Hal
Arkowitz, ''A Psychological Test Battery to Detect Prison Inmates Who Fake
· Insanity or Mental Retardation '' 8 Behav. Sci. ~ L. 75 (1990) (92 to percent
of all subjects correctly classified as either faking or not faking).

9S
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406 U.S. 715 (1972).

90

See Perlin, ''Tea Leaves,'' note 2

supra; Perlin, "Decoding," note 2
supra.
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See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 17821783.

91

See Michael L. Perlin, Riggins v.

Nevada: Forced Medication Collides
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Finally, Zinermon may lead the
states to mandate some sort of due
process hearing prior to the acceptance of any voluntary application for
admissions. New Jersey, for instance, has amended its court rules to
provide for hearings when a patient
wishes to convert from voluntary to
involuntary status. 92 Will such hearings simply be, in former Chief Justice Burger's famous phrase, "timeconsuming procedural minuets''; 93
will they serve to insulate clinicians
from constitutional tort liability; or
will they serve as a meaningful check
to make sure that individuals like the
plaintiff in Zinermon-who thought
he was signing himself into ''heaven" -not be improperly admitted to
psychiatric hospitals without some
measure of due process?
None of this will have any impact
if mentally disabled individuals are
not afforded adequate counsel both
in civil and criminal matters. The
majority opinion in Medina, for example, seems to be silently premised
on the faulty assumption that adequate counsel is available to defendants seeking to contest their trial
competency. All empirical surveys

have concluded that this is simply not
so, and that counsel made available
to mentally disabled criminal defendants is regularly substandard. 94 The
quality of counsel remains the single
most important factor in the disposition of cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants, 95 and where
this counsel is absent, the results are
predictable. The fact that thirteen
years after the court's decision in
Jackson, almost half of the states had
failed to implement it bespeaks the
inadequacy of counsel in this area. 96
Impact on Correctional Mental
Health Services
A brief summary of the expec.ted
impact of these cases on two specific
questions is in order: the extent of the
constitutional rights owed to individuals institutionalized in correctional
mental health facilities, and the potential liability of ~roviders if these
rights are violated. 7
First, nothing in any of these cases
deals directly with the issue resolved
by the Supreme Court in 1976 in
Estelle v. Gamble-that the government is obligated to provide medical
care to those it incarcerates. 98 After
94
See generally Michael L. Perlin,
''Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental
Disability Cases," 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 39 (1992); Michael L. Perlin &
Robert L. Sadoff, "Ethical Issues in the
Representation oflndividuals in the Commitment Process,'' 45 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 161(Summer1982).

With the Right to a Fair Trial,'' 17 Newsletter Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 81, 82
(1992).
92 In such cases, ''the court shall hold
a hearing within twenty days to determine
whether the patient had the capacity to
make an informed decision to convert to
voluntary status and whether the decision
was made knowingly and voluntarily,''
providing that counsel ''previously appointed" shall represent the patient at
such a hearing. N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(g)(l)
(1990).

9
'

See 2 Perlin, note 1 supra,§ 8.02.

96

Bruce Winick, "Restructuring
Competency to Stand Trial,'' 32 UCLA
L. Rev. 921, 940 (1985).
97
For comprehensive recent surveys,
see Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, "Inmates With Mental Disorders: A Guide
to Law and Practice," 16 Ment. & Phys.
Dis. L. Rep. 339, 462 (1992).

93

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605606 (1979); but see Michael L. Perlin,
''An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Warren
Burger's 'Time-Consuming Procedural
Minuets' Theory in Parham v. J. R. , '' 9
Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L . 149,
152 (1981).

98
422 U.S. 97, 104 (1~76); see 3
Perlin, note 1 supra, § 16.22; Perlin,
note 4 supra, § 4.44.
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several post-Gamble cases expanded
this concept to include a limited right
to mental health care, 99 subsequent
cases, decided after the Supreme
Court's 1982 Youngberg opinion that
articulated the ''subsequent professional judgment standard,'' were far
more cautious in mandating such services. 100 The question that must be
pondered here is whether the Riggins
decision use of ''least intrusive
means" language in any way augurs
a potential shift away from the professional judgment standard of Youngberg. It is simply too early to tell.
On the question of liability, it is
necessary to tum to Zinermon. This
case expands the Section 1983 civil
rights liability in an area where most
of the Supreme Court's other recent
decisions had made it more difficult
to maintain suit in cases involvinf.
tortious acts of state employees. 1 1
Neither the majority nor the dissent
appears to countenance the actions of
the state defendants in Zinermon, and
there is no reason to assume that the
decision was strictly an idiosyncratic
one limited to its own facts. Although
successful civil rights suits on behalf
of mentally disabled plaintiffs are still
rare, 102 the Zinermon decision certainly makes it likely that there will be
at least a modest upsurge in damages
litigation in this area in the future.
99

See, e.g., Bowring v. Godwin, 551
F .2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d
754 (3d Cir. 1979).
100
See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682
F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982); Capps v.
Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894 (D. Or. 1982).
101
See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986); see generally Susan
Bandes, "Monnell, Pa"att, Daniels and
Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or
Policy From a Random, Unauthorized
Act," 72 Iowa L. Rev. 101 ( 1986).

1
0'2

See 3 Perlin, note 1 supra,§ 12.25
(collecting cases); Perlin, note 4 supra,
§ 3.14 (same).

Foucha also flags important liability
issues. The Court's decision seems
almost a cue bid, making it clear to
litigators in states with Louisiana-like
statutes that nonmentally ill insanity
acquittees can no longer be held in
forensic facilities. Clearly, there are
liability implications here as well.
Conclusion

Finally, a word about some alternative academic approaches that may
help shed new light on some of these
issues. Researchers and scholars
have been using a series of constructs
to help illuminate this answer, such
as heuristics, sanism, and pretextuality .103
"Heuristics" is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to ~
plicit thinking devices that individuals use to oversimplify complex,
information-processing tasks. The
vivid case is remembered and made
representative of the whole universe
of cases; information is processed
to "fit'.' preexisting pictures of the
subject matter in question; we listen
to evidence that confirms our views,
and reject evidence that might force
us to reconsider; we ''ignore or misuse items of rationally useful information. '' 104
"Sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character
of other irrational prejudices that
cause (and are reflected in) prevailing
social attitudes of racism, sexism,
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. ios It
infects both our jurisprudence and
our lawyering practices. Sanism is
largely invisible and largely socially
acceptable. It is based largely on ste103
For a similar approach, see, e.g.,
Perlin, "Decoding," note 2 supra (right
to refuse treatment).
104

See, e.g., Perlin, note 46 supra, at

966~.46.
1
°' The classic study is G. Allport, The
Nature of Prejudice (1955).

reotype, myth, superstition, and
deindividualization, and is sustained
and perpetuated by our use of false
"ordinary common sense" and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life
and in the legal process. 106
The entire relationship between the
legal process and mentally disabled
litigants is often pietextual. Courts
accept (either implicitly or explicitly)
testimonial dishonesty and engage
similarly in dishonest (frequently
meretricius) decision making, 107 specifically where witnesses, especially
expert witnesses, show a ''high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired
ends. " 108
Finally, ''therapeutic jurisprudence'' studies the role of the law as a
therapeutic agent. 109 This perspective
recognizes that substantive rules, legal procedures, and lawyers' roles
may have either therapeutic or
antitherapeutic consequences, and
questions whether such rules, procedures, and roles can or should be
reshaped so as to enhance their thera-

peutic potential, while not subordinating due process principles. 110
While an impressive body ofliterature has been produced, there has not
yet been a systematic investigation
into the reasons why some courts
decide cases ''therapeutically'' and
others ''antitherapeutically. '' One
could conclude that sanism is such a
dominant psychological force that it
(1) distorts "rational" decision making; (2) encourages (albeit on at least
a partially unconscious level) pretextuality; and (3) prevents decision
makers from intelligently and coherently focusing on questions that are
meaningful to therapeutic jurisprudential inquiries. 111
A reconsideration of the Supreme
Court cases using these filters might
help bring some coherence to any
area that has been, for many years, a
"doctrinal abyss, " 112 and might fill
in a few more pieces of the puzzle.

Postscript
In the 1992 term, the Supreme
Court's ''doctrinal abyss'' deepened. 113 In Godinez v. Moran, 114 it
110
David Wexler, "Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity Acquittee Conditional Release Process,'' 27
Crim. L. Bull. 18, 19 n.5 (1991).
111
See M. Perlin, note 58 supra (suggesting that influence of sanism must be
considered in therapeutic jurisprudence
investigations); Michael L. Perlin,
"What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?"
10 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 623 (1993)
(same); Perlin, "Pretextual Bases," note
9 supra (same). Michael L. Perlin,
"Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual Bases
of Mental Disability Law," 19 N. Eng.
J. Crim. & Civ. Confinement (1994) (in
press) (same).

106 See generally Perlin, "Sanism,"
note 9 supra; Perlin & Dorfman, note 9
supra; see also Michael L. Perlin, "The
Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty
Cases: The Puzzling Role of 'Mitigating'
Mental Disability Evidence,'' 8 Notre
DameJLEthics&Pub. Pol'y239(1994).
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See Perlin, "Morality," note 9
supra, at 133; see generally Perlin, "Pretexts," note 9 supra; Perlin, "Pretextual
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Charles Sevilla, ''The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury,'' 11 San
Diego L. Rev. 839, 840 (1974).
109 See D. Wexler, note 9 supra; D.
Wexler & B. Winick, note 9 supra; David
Wexler, ''Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship," 11 Behav. Sci. & L. 17 (1993);
David Wexler, "Putting Mental Health
in Mental Health Law,'' 16 Law & Hum.
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addressed a question over which the
lower courts had split: Was there
a higher standard of competency to
plead guilty than to stand trial? 11 5 It
ended the controversy by holding that
the standard for pleading guilty was
no higher than for standing trial. 116
In earlier proceedings , the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed a district court denial of Moran's application for a writ of habeas
corpus, concluding that the trial record should have led the trial court to
' 'entertain a good faith doubt about
[Moran's] competency to make a voluntary, knowing , and intelligent
waiver,' ' and that waiver of constitutional rights required a ' 'higher level
of mental functioning than that required to stand trial,'' a level it characterized as ''the capacity for 'reasoned choice. ' " 117 The Supreme
Court reversed, per Justice Thomas,
rejecting the notion that competence
to plead guilty must be measured by
a higher (or even different) standard
from that used in competency-tostand.:.trial cases. 118
It reasoned that a defendant who
was found competent to stand trial
would have to make a variety of decisions requiring choices: whether to
testify, whether to seek a jury trial,
whether to cross-examine his accusers, and, in some cases , whether to
m See 3 Perlin, note 1 supra, § 14.20
(discussing cases).

raise an affirmative defense. 119 While
the decision to plead guilty is a ''profound one," "it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions
that a defendant may be called upon to
make during the course of a trial.' ' 120
Finally, the court reaffirmed that any
waiver of constitutional rights must
be "knowing and voluntary. " 121
It concluded on this point:
Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest
aim: It seeks to ensure that he has
the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.
While psychiatrists and scholars
may find it useful to classify the
various kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free
to adopt competency standards ·that
are more elaborate than the Dusky
formulation, the Due Process
Clause does not impose these additional requirements. 122
Justices Kennedy and Scalia concurred, noting their concern with
those aspects of the opinion that compared the decisions made by a defendant who pleads guilty with those
made by one who goes to trial, and
expressing their ''serious doubts''
that there would be a ·heightened competency standard under the Due Process clause if these decisions were
not equivalent. 123
119

116

After Moran was found competent
to stand trial, he discharged his counsel
and pied guilty (explaining that he wanted
to prevent the presentation of mitigating
evidence at his sentencing) , id. at 2683 ,
the court accepted his guilty plea, finding
that it had been " freely and voluntarily"
given. Id. He was subsequently sentenced
to death. Id.
117
Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263 ,
165- 167 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S.
Ct. 2680 (1993).
118

Godinez , 113 S. Ct. at 2682.

i20

Id. at 2686.
Id.

121
Id. at 2687 (quoting Parke v. Raley ,
113 S. Ct. 517, 523 (1992)).
122
Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at2688 (citing,
in a cf. reference, Medina v. California,
112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992). In Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), the
Supreme Court set down the substantive
test for competency to stand trial. See
Perlin, note 4 supra,§ 4.04.
123
Godinez, 113 S. Ct. at 2688 (emphasis added).
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He concluded:
To try, convict and punish one so
helpless to defend himself contravenes fundamental principles of
fairness and impugns the integrity
of our criminal justice system. I
cannot condone the decision to accept, without further inquiry, the
self-destructive ''choice'' of a person who was so deeply medicated
and who might well have been severely mentally ill. 127
Justice Blackmun' s dissent in Godinez is a powerful document ~~t
speaks simultaneousl>' t~ the ~mpm
cal realities of the crumnal tnal process, the impact of mental ~lness a~d
medication on a defendant s capacity
for reasoned choice, and, perhaps,
most important, the role of pretextuality in the incompetency-to-standtrial process. 128 He rejects the formulistic approach of Justice Thomas~s
majority opinion, weighs the pertinent social science evidence, and
demonstrates how the trial record reflects the ''ambiguity' ' of the controlling colloquy between counsel and
the trial judge.
The underlying tensions of the case
are exacerbated even further because
the defendant had been sentenced to
death. The Supreme Court has considered the relationship between
mental illnes·s and the competency to
be executed, 129 the relationship between mental retardation and the
competency to be executed, 130 and,

Justice Blackmun dissented (for
himself and Justice Stevens), focusing squarely on what he saw as the
likely potential that Moran's decision
to plead guilty was the product of
''medication and mental illness. '' 124
He reviewed the expert testimony as
to the defendant's state of depression,
a colloquy between the defendant and
the trial judge in which the court
was informed that the defendant was
being given medication, the trial
judge's failure to inquire further and
discover the psychoactive properties
of the drugs in question, the defendant's subsequent testimony as to the
"numbing" state of the drugs, and
the "mechanical character" and
"ambiguity" of the defendant's answers to the court's questions at the
plea stage. 125
On the question of the multiple
meanings of competency, Justice
Blackmun added:
[T]he majority cannot isolate the
term' 'competent'' and apply it in a
vacuum, divorced from its specific
context. A person who is ''competent' ' to play basketball is not
thereby "competent" to play the
violin. The majority's monolithic
approach to competency is true to
neither life or the law. Competency for one purpose does not
necessarily translate to competency for another purpose. 126
124

Id. at 2692.
Id. at 2692-2693. See also id. at
2696 ("such drugs often possess side
effects that may 'compromise the right of
a medicated criminal defendant to receive
a fair trial . . . by rendering him unable or
unwilling to assist counsel,' " (quoting
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810,
1818-1819 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
126
Id. at 2694 (citing Bonnie, "The
Competence of Criminal Defendants: A
Theoretical Reformulation," 10 Behav.
Sci. & L. 291, 299 (1992)); R. Roesch
& S. Golding, Competency to Stand Trial
10-13 (1980).
125

121

Id. at 2696.
See 3 Perlin, note 1 supra,
§ 14.07A (1994 pocket part); Perlin,
''Pretexts,'' note 9 supra.
128

129
See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399 (1986); see 3 Perlin, note 1 supra,
§§ 17.02-17.06; see generally Perlin,
Jurisprudence, note 34 supra.
130
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989); see 3 Perlin, note 1 supra,
§§ 17.06A(1994pocketpart), 17.09; see
generally Perlin, Jurisprudence, note 34
supra.
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more recently, has declined to consider ·o n the merits the constitutionality of medicating a defendant so as to
make him competent to be executed. 131 The decision in Godinezvirtually guaranteeing less searching
131
See Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S.
38 (1990); see 3 Perlin, note 1 supra,
§ 17 .06B (1994 pocket part); see generally Perlin, Jurisprudence, note 34 supra.

inquiries in cases involving defendants of questionable competency132-will likely complicate even
further this area of mental disability
law jurisprudence.
132
See, e.g., United States v. Day,
998 F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting defendant's claim that the court
should have conducted a competency
hearing prior to allowing him to proceed
prose).

